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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MACK HALLADAY and
MERLE HALLADAY,
PlaintiffsAppellants,

Case No. 17754

vs.
MADGE CLUFF, PERRY K.
BIGELOW and NORMA G.
BIGELOW,
DefendantsRespondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS BIGELOW
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs-Appellants brought this

ac~~on

to quiet

title in them to.certain properties also claimed by the
defendants-respondents.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was tried to the Court.

The Court quieted

title in plaintiffs-appellants to the parcel shown as W-X-Y-

z

on Appendix A, quieted title in defendants-respondents

Bigelow to the property colored brown on Appendix A, and
quieted title in defendants-respondents Cluff and Bigelow to
the parcel designated P-M-N-0 on Appendix A.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants-Respondents Bigelow seek to have the decision of the trial Court affirmed in all respects.

1
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
As long as anyone presently alive can remember, there
has been a fence running along the lines shown in red on
Appendix A, and designated by the letters Y-X-P-M, M-N, and
N-0 and its continuation.

259.)

(R. 300, see also 160-61, 216,

For the same period of time, the property enclosed on

three sides by the fence has been occupied and used by the
respondents and their predecessors in interest, and, with
the exception of some recent verbal assertions of ownership
(R. 175-76, 177-78, 277-79), the appellants and their predecessors in interest who have occupied the lands outside the
fence have not occupied, used, or attempted to_ use any of
the lands within the fence.

(R. 167-68, 221-23, 264, 268,

269-70, 271-73, 277.)
The Bigelows purchased their property (Lot 2 on the
attached Appendix A) from the Jewetts on June 18, 1947.
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 2; R. 263.)

From all visual appear-

ances the property extended from the road in front (south)
of the property to the fence in the back (north).

The

Jewetts, Bigelows' predecessors in interest, had occupied
back to the fence • .(R. 264.)

The ·Bigelows also occupied

the property back to the fence.

The evidence presented at

trial showed that the Bigelows raised turkeys in a shed in
the northeast corner of the property next to the fence.
(R. 265.)

They built a chicken coop in the northwest corner

2
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of their property next to the fence.

(R. 265.)

They cul-

tivated a garden in this northern area of what they believed
to be their property, and also harvested fruit from trees
growing there.

(R. 266-67, 274.)

The Bigelows acted under

the impression that they had purchased the property back to
the fence (R. 264, 272); however, the property actually
delineated by the legal description on their warranty deed
is offset approximately 50 feet south of the property occupied
on the ground, giving the Bigelows record title to the roadway but no record title to the north end of the property
they occupied. (R. 129, 136, 141.)

The Bigelows paid the

taxes which were assessed on their property each year since
they purchased it.

(R. 281; defendants' Exhibit No. 25.)

The Cluff and Bigelow properties were not the only ones
offset south of occupancy.

In 1924 John Clift, who at the

time owned all the property shown on Appendix A, deeded to
Athol Blake and James Fisher, respectively, properties
somewhat analogous to the present Parcels 6 and 7 (R. 33435).

The present Parcels 6 and 7 have Center Street as

their north boundary.

However, the parcels conveyed to

Fisher and Blake were located 50 feet south_of Center Street,
and included parts of Parcel 4, the area in dispute (R. 33435).

The approximately 50 foot offset was corrected later

that same year by Clift deeding to Fisher and Blake the 50
foot parcels between their properties and Center Street, in

3
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exchange for them deeding back to Clift the south 50 feet of
their properties, including much of what is now the disputed
Parcel 4 (R. 335-36, see also R. 337, 341).
The Clifts did not pay the taxes for 1946 through 1950
on those parcels received back from Fisher and Blake (R.
337), and the property was therefore sold at a tax sale.
However, for some unexplained reason the property purportedly
conveyed by the tax sale was slightly larger than those
properties Clift had received from Fisher and Blake and upon
which he had failed to pay the taxes (R. 340-41).
The property conveyed by the tax deed was the parcel
designated as A-B-C-D on Appendix A, which measures 75 feet
by 181.5 feet and contains approximately .31 acres [the deed
shows an area of .21 acres, but this is apparently in error]
{defendants' Exhibit No. 27, plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 29).
This property was conveyed to Mayor George Collard upon his
payment of $26.34 to the County {id.).
The record does not disclose why Mayor Collard purchased
the ~~B-C-D parcel of land at the tax sale~ it does clearly
show, however, that he never occupied it (R. 167, 228).
Mayor Collard apparently made no attempts to assert ownership,
for it wasn't until later, after Albert Halladay (plaintiff's
father and predecessor in interest) affirmatively investigated,
that the Halladays knew of Mayor Collard's record title to
the parcel in question (R. 167).

In July, 1958, the plaintiff

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

Mack Halladay and his father, Albert Halladay, obtained a
quit claim deed to the A-B-C-D parcel of land from Mayor
Collard for an undisclosed sum of money, and in November of
that same year Albert Halladay quit claimed his interest in
the parcel to his son (plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 29).
The appellants and their predecessors in interest were
already in possession of over half of the A-B-C-D parcel
when they purchased whatever interest Mayor Collard had in
it.

Slightly less than half of the parcel, the area desig-

nated by the letters M-N-0-P on Appendix A, was occupied by
respondents.

About one year prior to acquiring record title

to the M-N-0-P parcel, Mack Halladay told Perry Bigelow that
he had purchased a parcel of property in Bigelows' back yard
(R. 277, Appellants' Brief at 8).
further assertions

~f

Mack Halladay made no

ownership until

th~

1970's, when he

periodically told Perry Bigelow that he claimed the property
( R. 278).

The tr_ial court specifically found that:
The only evidence of plaintiffs' asserting a
claim of ownership and title to the tract in
dispute~ cross-hatched in orange, points M-N0-P on Exhibits 8 and 12 was an incident
occuring in 1977 or 1978 when plaintiffs'
[sic] asserted title thereto as against
defendant Bigelow and ordered Bigelow to
cease digging a potato cellar thereon.
Defendant Bigelow moved his digging within
the ground to which he held legal title, but
testified that he did not acknowledge plaintiffs' superior right to the land is [sic]
dispute.

(R. 54).

In 1979 the plaintiff attempted to install a fence
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across the back of Bigelows' property, which fence Bigelow
removed (R. 278-279), and this action was commenced soon
thereafter (R. 4-7).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE IS
APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THE TAX SALE OF PROPERTY ON
BOTH SIDES OF THE BOUNDARY.
The occupancy of the lands involved in this lawsuit is
not in dispute.

Bigelows and Cluffs occupied the land south

of the M-N fenceline since 1947 and 1948; during the same
period the Halladays and his parents occupied the land north
of the fence.

There was substantial evidence ·that the

Halladays did not seriously dispute Bigelows' claim to the
disputed area south of the fence until 1977 or 1978 (R. 54).
However, for the brief period from 1951 to 1958, a third
person held record title to land on both sides of the M-N
· fenceline, although the evidence indicated that he never in
any way attempted to occupy or possess the land.

The only

substantial question presented by this appeal is what effect,
if any, did this third person's unasserted record interest
have on the rights to the parties to this lawsuit.
"The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence derives from [the]
realization, ancient in our law, that the peace and good
order of society is best served by leaving at rest possible
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disputes over long established boundaries."
525 P.2d 725, 726 (Utah 1974).

Baum v. Defa,

The doctrine of boundary by

acquiescence evolved from the doctrine of adverse possession.
Holmes v. Judge, 31 Utah 269, 87 P. 1009, 1012 (1906).

This

Court has established four elements which must be shown to
establish a boundary by acquiescence:
(1) occupation up to a visible line marked
definitely by monuments, fences or buildings
and (2) acquiescence in the line as the
boundary (3) for a long period of years (4)
by adjoining landowners.
Fuoco v. Williams, 15 Utah 2d 156, 389 ·P.2d 143, 145 (1964).
Point I of appellants' Brief contends that the last
element, that the parties be adjoining landowners, was not
satisfied.
Case law exploring the purposes and limits of the
requirement that the parties be adjoining landowners is at
least scarce and probably nonexistent.

The evident purpose

of the requirement is to state the obvious rule that the
only acquiescence that is material to a boundary dispute is
the acquiescence of those who live next to the boundary.

The

requirement is akin to that of standing: only those whose
rights would be affected by the location of a boundary in a
certain place have "standing" to acquiesce in the location
of that boundary.
This apparent requirement of "standing" is clearly
satisfied in the instant case.

Each of the parties to this

7 by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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lawsuit have a very definite interest in the location of the
boundaries between their properties, and they are the only
ones that have such an interest.

In all respects, this is

the type of dispute that the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence was developed to resolve.

The fact that at one time

a third person held record title to land on both sides of
the disputed boundary should not be allowed to obscure the
fact that the parties to· this lawsuit and their predecessors
in interest have acquiesced in the fenceline as the boundary
between their respective occupancies for a period well in
excess of fifty years.

The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence

should be held to apply to the instant case.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL CLEARLY ESTABLISHED
EACH OF THE ELEMENTS OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE.
A.

The decision of the trial court should be affirmed

unless the evidence clearly preponderates against the trial
court's findings or there was a misapplicatlon of the law.
The decisions of this Court clearly establish that
although the appellant's burden on appeal of a suit in
equity is somewhat less than for an action at law, that
burden is nonetheless very substantial, both as to findings
of fact and conclusions of law.

The appellant must make a

very clear showing of error in order to justify reversing
the decree of the trial court.

The trial judge is given a

considerable latitude of discretion in determining whether
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equity and good conscience require that relief be granted.
Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979).

There is a

strong presumption that the decision of the trial court is
correct and supported by the evidence:
[I]t has long been established and reiterated
by this court in numerous cases that due to
the advantaged position of the trial court we
will review its findings and judgments with
considerable indulgence, and will not disagree
with and upset them unless the evidence
clearly preponderates against them, or the
court has mistaken or misapplied the law
applicable thereto.
Pagano v. Walker, 539 P.2d 452, 454 (Utah 1975); followed in
Ryan v. Earl, 618 P.2d 54 (Utah 1980).
In order to establish their claim of boundary by

acqui~

escence the respondents were required to prove the existance
of four elements:
( 1) occu·pa tion up to a visible line marked
definitely by monuments, fences or buildings
and (2) acquiescence in the line as the
boundary (3) for a long period of years (4)
by adjoining land owners.
Fuoco v. Williams, 15 Utah 2d 156, 389 P.2d 143, 145 (1964).
The trial court concluded that each of these elements had
been established.

As demonstrated below, the evidence does

not clearly preponderate against the findings of the trial
court upon which its conclusion was based; on the contrary,
there is substantial evidence in support of the trial court's
findings.

Likewise, the trial court was not mistaken in its

understanding of or application of the law applicable to

9 by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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each of the above mentioned elements.

The decision of the

trial court should therefore be affirmed.
Attached hereto for the convenience of the Court are
the following:
Appendix A - Map of the properties.
Appendix B - Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
Appendix C - Decree.
B.

The evidence clearly established occupation up to a

visible line marked

~efinitely

by monuments, fences or build-

ings.
This element is not in dispute.
6.

Appellants' Brief at

For a period of time well in excess of 20

y~ars

the

respondents have used, occupied ·and treated as their own the
land up to (south of) the M-N fence.

The fence is definitely

marked, clearly visible, and has been in existence for more
than 50 years.

c.

The evidence established acquiescence in the fence

as the boundary between the properties of the respondents
and the appellants.
The trial court concluded that the appellants (Halladay)
had acquiesced in the M-N fence as the boundary between
their property and that of the respondents (Cluff and Bigelow).
This conclusion was based on findings that the P-M-N-0
fenceline has marked the boundary of occupancy of the respondents since before 1948 and that the respondents and their
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predecessors "have built improvements upon the land,

[and]

have occupied it for the purpose of farming, storage and
business operat1"ons."

{R . 54 . )

The. co ur t f ur th er f oun d

that the appellants "have never occupied" the disputed area
south of the fence, and that:
The only evidence of plaintiffs' asserting a
claim of ownership and title to the tract in
dispute, cross-hatched in orange, points M-N0-P on [Appendix A] was an incident occuring
in 1977 or 1978 when plaintiffs' [sic]
asserted title thereto as against defendant
Bigelow and ordered Bigelow to cease digging
a potato cellar thereon.
Defendant Bigelow
moved his digging within the ground to which
he held legal title, but testified that he
did not acknowledge p1aintiffs' superior
right to the land is [sic] dispute •.
Appellants advanced two arguments in opposition to the
trial court's findings:

(1)

The appellants' purchase of

land south of the fence is antithetical to.acquiescence in
the fence as a boundary, and (2) the appellants have periodically claimed ownership to the disputed parcel, and the
respondents' use thereof was therefore with the appellants'
permission.

These arguments will be treated in their re-

spective order.
The appellants contend that:
Although plaintiffs may have allowed defendants to occupy portions of Parcel P-M-N-0,
plaintiffs did not purchase an entire parcel
of ground simply to give it away to adjoining
landowners. Purchasing real estate is not
acquiescence that a third party may have it.
Plaintiffs' purchase of Parcel P-M-N-0 is
antithetical to their acquiescence in the M-N

11
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fence as a boundary between plaintiffs'
property and defendants' property.
Appellants' Brief at 5-6.
The above statement is based on the fact that in 1958
the appellants purchased from Mayor Collard a parcel of
ground.

Insofar as the above quotation implies that all the

appellants' purchased was the P-M-N-0 parcel, the statement
is clearly wrong.

The land encompassed by the deed from

Collard to the appellants is designated as A-B-C-D on Appendix A, and comprises an area of 13,612.5 square feet.

The

disputed P-M-N-0 parcel, comprising approximately 6,271.6
square feet, is less than half of the total area the appellants purchased from Collard.

Appellants' contention· that,

since they already had colorable title to more than half of
the A-B-C-D parcel, all they really purchased was the P-M-N0 parcel is simply not established by the evidence.

It is

one inference that could be drawn from the evidence, but it
is only that.

An equally, if not more, plausible inference

is that the appellants were simply trying to remove a cloud
on their title..

In support of this latter inference is the

evidence that Mayor Collard apparently paid only $26.34 for
the A-B-C-D parcel, and apparently had no intentions of
taking possession of the parcel.

It wasn't until some time

after Collard acquired record title that the appellants were
even aware of Collard's claim to the property, and that was
only after the appellants' affirmative investigation (R.
167).

When the appellants discovered the cloud on their title
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they purchased Collard's interest.
The inference that the appellants were simply removing a
cloud on their own title is further supported by the evidence,
more fully discussed in.the next section, that, with the exception of occasional unsupported verbal assertions, the
appellants made no effort to take possession of the P-M-N-0
parcel until approximately 20 years after they supposedly
acquired title to it.

This failure to assert their interest ir

the M-N-0-P parcel was rational only if their intent in buying
the A-B-C-D parcel was merely to· remove a cloud on their title4
However, if the focus of their purchase was really the M-N-0-P
parcel, their failure for over 20 years to physically assert
possession was so irrational as to belie their stated intent.
The trial court concluded that the appellants' purchase o:
the A-B-C-D parcel ·did not vitiate their acquiescence in the M·
fenceline as a boundary.

The evidence does not preponderate

against that finding, and the court was not under a misapprehension of the law.

The decision should be affirmed.

As a second argument in opposition to the trial court's
conclusion that the appellants acquiesced in the M-N fence lin
as a boundary, the appellants assert that:
There is no testimony that any question about
a boundary line arose prior to 1978. Mr.
Halladay has always claimed the P-M-N-0
property even though he allowed defendants to
use it.

13
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[P]laintiffs have on many occasions claimed
ownership of the P-M-N-0 parcel during the
period of plaintiffs' alleged acquiescence in
the M-N fence as a boundary line.
·
Appellants' Brief at 9, 10.
The incidents referred to by the appellants are that
Mack Halladay told Perry Bigelow some time between 1957 and
1960 that Halladay had purchased a piece of ground in Bigelows'
back yard, and that again off and on during the last ten
years Halladay again claimed ownership to the disputed
parcel, but never took any action to occupy or use the
property (R. 277-78).

That such passive verbal assertions

unsupported by any form of physical act are not sufficient
to vitiate acquiescence was clearly established by this
~--

Court in Lane v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 119, 505 P.2d 1199
(1973).

The appellants in that case likewise asserted that

they did not "interid" the fence to be a boundary.

The court

responded:
To this we say that the test to establish the
boundary by "acquiescence" necessarily need
not be based on mutual "intent." "Intent" is
not synonymous with "acquiescence" in these
cases·. "Acquiescence" is more nearly synonymous with "indolence," or "c.onsent by silence,"
--or a knowledge that a fence or other monuments appears to be a boundary,--but that no
one did anything about it for 48 years. No
one in this case did much except by invective,
across the very fence that made irritants out
of erstwhile neighbors, for 48 years,--until
suddenly the appreciation of property values
transmuted yesteryear's minimal values into
objects d'art of inestimable value in the
real estate market.
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The trial Court concluded that the appellant's occasional invectives across the fence did not counteract his
physical acquiescence.

The evidence does not preponderate

against that finding and conclusion, and the trial court was
not under a misapprehension of the law.

The decision should

therefore be affirmed.
D.

The evidence established that the appellants'

acquiescence was for a long period of years.
As established above, there was substantial evidence
presented at trial that the appellants acquiesced in the
fence as the boundary for over 20 years.
However, even assuming, arguendo, that the acquiescence
··-

only extended over a period of ·12 years (appellants' Brief
at 11-12), that should not defeat respondents' claim of
boundary by acquiescence.

Although a period ·of 20 years is

generally required, this Court has clearly stated "that
there is no exact time requirement; and that it may
upon the circumstances of the particular case."

depen~

Hobson v.

Panguitch Lake Corp., 530 P.2d 792, 795 (Utah 1975); see also
Boyer v. Noirot, 97 Ill. App. 3d 636, 423 N.E.2d 274 (1981).
Under the unusual circumstances of this case, a lesser
period should be deemed sufficient.

The fence has been

treated as a boundary between the properties for over 50
years.

The only possible interruption of that acquiescence

is the result of a tax deed whose original owner (Collard)

15
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was never seen on the property in question, and whose subsequent purchaser {the appellants} did nothing more than
utter invectives across the fence to assert their ownership to the lesser portion of the property covered by the
tax deed.
E.

The evidence established that the acquiescence in

the fence as a boundary was by adjoining landowners.
As established in Point I of this brief, to treat the
parties to this action as adjoining landowners would satisfy
the purposes of this element of the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence.

Each of the elements of that doctrine having

been satisfied, the decision of the trial court should be
affirmed.
POINT III
THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE DOES
NOT REQUIRE THAT THERE BE AN EXPLICIT AGREEMENT
OR DISPUTE AS TO THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE
RESPECTIVE PROPERTIES.
Although some earlier cases may have appeared to require that the parties acquiesce or agree on a boundary
between their properties after a dispute as to the location
of that boundary, that requirement was plainly put to rest
in Hobson v. Panguitch Lake Corp., 530 P.2d 792 {Utah 1975);
see also Note,

~oundaries

by Agreement and Acquiescence in

Utah, 1975 Utah L. Rev. 221.

In that case the court stated

that the purpose of the doctrine was not to give effect to
the resolution of dispute, but rather to prevent disputes:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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The very reason for being of the doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence or agreement is that
in the interest of preserving the peace and
good order of society the quietly resting
bones of the past, which no one seems to have
been troubled or complained about for a long
period of years, should not be unearthed for
the purpose of stirring up controversy, but
should be left in their repos~.
530 P.2d at 794.
CONCLUSION
For a long period of years, at least 20, and probably
more than 50, the appellants and their predecessors in
interest have occupied the land north of the M-N fence, and
have acquiesced in the fact that the respondents and their
predecessors in interest have occupied the land south of the
..

fence.

The trial court concluded that that fence should be

established as the boundary between the properties of the
parties to this lawsuit.

The evidence does not clearly

preponderate against the findings of the trial Court, and
the trial Court was not under a misapprehension as to the
law applicable thereto.

The decision of the trial Court

should therefore be affirmed in all respects.
DATED this 19th day of February, 1982.

Respectfully

sUf?ni5Jed,

'">

/

,

\_

/'

~

-

i='Rt}~i ~fo;:l_JJ

, HOW-ARD,rLEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Respondents
·
Bigelows
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MAILED two copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondents
to Brent D. Young, Ivie and Young, Attorneys for Appellants,
P. O. Box 672, Provo, Utah 84603 and to M. Dayle Jeffs,
Jeffs & Jeffs, Attorneys for Respondents Cluff, P. O. Box
683, Provo, Utah 84603, this 19th day of February, 1982.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18

A P P E N D I X

A

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

.I

~1
~

~I
~I

!.._.:1_;_.u~1'7 "oo ·w

r,z.oo·

----e
• I

~j

i·
11!

~

!

l
1~
I

®

I

~1

HALLA DAY

CLUFF

@

.BIG-EL.OW

0

'
l-IALLA:DAY ~i
~!

·~1

CD

Cl

;;1

I
'

l
j

i

l

J.S

tDO

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

zc,·'

;c
;
i

A P P E N D I X

B

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

2
3

4
5

M. DAYLE JEFFS OF JEFFS AND JEFFS
Attorneys for Defendant
90 North 100 East
P. 0. Box 683
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone:
373-8848

6

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY

7

8

STATE OF UTAH
MACK HALLADAY and
HALLADAY,

MERLE

9

Plaintiffs,

10

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIOl~S OF LAW

vs.

11

12

MADGE CLUFF, PERRY K.
BIGELOW and NORMA G.
BIGELOW,

Civil No.

53,243

13
Defendants.

14
15

This watter came before the Court for trial on the

16
17

28th day of August, 1980, Brent D. Young, Esq., appearing for
the plaintiffs, tl. Dayle Jeffs, Esq., appearing for defendant

'18

19

Cluff, and S. Rex Lewis, Esq., appearing for defendants
Bigelow.

The parties presented their evidence and after

20
having presented final arguments to the Court on the facts

21
22
23

and the law the Court took the matter under advisement.

On

December 3, 1980, plaintiff brought a Motion to Reopen for
the purpose of offering additional evidence as to plaintiffs'

24
claim of title.

The Court granted the Motion to Reopen and

25
received the additional· evidence and having fully considered

26
the same, now makes and enters its:

27
FINDINGS OF FACT

28
1.

29

Plaintiffs and plaintiffs predecessors

in interest have occupied up to the visible boundary fenceline

30
in parcel 3 shown on Exhibit #12 and cross-hatched in green,

31
32
JEFFS AND JEFFS
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
90 NORTH 100 EAST

P.O. BOX 113

PROVO. UTAH 84601
373-8848
Sponsored(801)
by the
S.J. Quinney
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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1

2

lying within the title of the defendant, Madge Kelson Cluff,

3

for many years, more particularly described as follows:
Commencing 606.35 feet West and 319.36 feet North from the
Southeast corner of Section 2, Township 7 South, Range 2
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89°00' West
along the North boundary of 100 South Street, Provo, Utah
10.36 feet; thence North 1°00' East 174.10 feet; tnence
South 89°00 1 East 7.49 feet; thence South 0°03'17" West
along a fence line 174.12 feet to the point of beginning.
Area= 0.04 acres

4

5
6

7

8
2.

9

The parties hereto have acquiesced in said

10

line as a boundary line for a long period of years as adjoining

11

land owners.
3.

12

The court finds that defendants Bigelow and

13

their predecessors in interest have occupied that strip of

14

land within the legal title of plaintiffs Halladay on Exhibit

15

#12 in parcel 1, which is cross-hatched in brown.

16

hereto have acquiesced in said line as a boundary for a long

17

period of years by the adjoining land owners.

18

more particularly described as follows:

19

The parties

Said parcel is

Commencing 488.57 feet West and 317.30 feet North from the
Southeast corner of Section 2, Township 7 South, Range 2
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89°00' West
along the North boundary of 100 South Street, Provo, Utah
7.29 feet; thence North 1° 00' East 177.60 feet; thence
East 4.67 feet; thence South 0°09'25" West alonq a fence
line 177.70 feet to the point of beginning. Area= 0.02 Acres.

20
21

22
23
24

4.

25

As to the property in controversy between

26

the plaintiffs and defendants Cluff and Bigelow shown on

27

Exhibit #12, cross-hatched in orange and marked by points

28

M-N-0-P, the court finds that:

29

(a)

The plaintiffs succeeded to a tax

30

title to the description outlined in yellow on Exhibit #12

31

and marked by points A-B-C-D.

Tax title was issued to George

32
.JEFFS AND JEFFS
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1

2

E. Collard by Utah County on the 23rd day of May, 1951 and

3

recorded June 28, 1951 in the off ice of the Utah County Recorder.

4

This document is defendant's Exhibit #27.

5

(b)

The tax deed is regular on its face.

6

(c)

The plaintiffs have never occupied

7

the area cross-hatched in orange on Exhibits #8 and #12, nor

8

the area within the fencelines identified on Exhibits #8 and

9

#12 as points P-M-N-0.

10

(d)

11

The fence between points P-M-N-0 have

existed for many years.
5.

12

The fenceline marked P-M-N-0 has marked

13

the boundary of occupancy of the defendants Cluff and Bigelow

14

and their predecessors in interest since before 1948.
6.

15

The defendants Cluffs and Bigelow and

16

their predecessors have built improvements upon the land,

17

have occupied it for purpose of farming, storage and business

18

operations.
7.

19

The fenceline M-N has been in existence

20

for over 50 years according to the testimony of plaintiffs'

21

witnesses.

22

8.

The only evidence of plaintiffs' asserting a

23

claim of ownership and title to the tract in dispute, cross-

24

hatched in orange, points H-N-0-P on Exhibits 8 and 12 was

25

an incident occurring in 1977 or 1978 when plaintiffs'

26

asserted title thereto as against defendant Bigelow and

27

ordered Bigelow to cease digging a potato cellar thereon.

28

Defendant Bigelow moved his digging within the ground to

29

which he held legal title, but testified that he did not

30

acknowledge plaintiffs' superior right to the land is dis-

31

pute.

32
J~

JEFFS AND JEFFS
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
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II

II

1
9.

2

The court visited the premises and in

3

viewing the north boundary of the land in dispute, point

4

M-N on Exhibits 8 and 12, observed that there was a well

5

developed fenceline and a planted area marking that as the

6

area of occupancy as between the plaintiffs' property on

7

the north and defendant's property on the south.

8

possession of the disputed ground was in the defendants

9

as of the date of viewing as was shown by the witnesses

The

10

called and the documentary evidence, including photographs,

11

that were submitted to the court.

10.

12

Thero is no record title in either of

13

the defendants to the property in dispute.

14

legal title to their north boundaries is along a fence

15

approximately from point P to point 0 on Exhibits 8 and 12.

11.

16

The defendants

The acquisition of title by plaintiffs'

17

through the tax deed to George Collard of May, 1951 includes

18

a 20 foot strip within Halladays chain of title to parcels

19

6 and 7.
12.

20

Plaintiffs' chain of title to parcels 6

21

and 7 and the area north of points M to N on Exhibits 8 and

22

12 was not based on the tax sale.

23
24

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the
Court now makes and enters its:

25

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
l.

26

The court concludes that neither the tax

27

title limitation statutes nor the succeeding to legal title

28

by tax deed cut off the defendants claims to title by

29

acquiescence to the property within the fences described

30

as

31

M~N-0-P

on Exhibits 8 and 12.
2.

The plaintiffs have established the

32
JEFFS AND JEFFS
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
90 NORTH 100 EAST

P. Q, BOX 183

PROVO, UTAH 8460 I
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1

2

elements for boundary by acquiescence as to the.cross-hatched

3

green area in parcel 3 on Exhibit 12 by establishing:
(a)

4

Occupation by defendants and their

5

predecessors in interest up to a visible line marked definitely

6

by fences and other visible monuments.

(b)

Acquiescence in the line as to the

9

(c)

For a long period of years.

10

(d)

By adjoining land owners.

7

8

11

boundary.

3.

The defendants Bigelow have established

12

the elements of a boundary by acquiescence as to the cross-

13

hatched area in brown on Exhibit 12 in parcel 1 by the same

14

standards set forth in paragraph 2 above.

15

4.

The defendants have established title by

16

acquiescence to the property within the fences described as

17

points M-N-0-P on Exhibits 8 and 12 by the same standards set

18

forth in paragraph 2 above.

19

5.

The court concludes that as to each of

20

the above matters, the respective parties have established

21

their title by acquiescence pursuant to the rulings in

22

Fuoco vs. Williams, 15 Utah 2d 156, 389 P.2d 143 (1964);

23

Hales vs. Frakes, 600 P.2d 556 (1979); and Brown vs. Peterson,

24

Supreme Court No. 16785 decided December 18, 1980.

25
26

Dated and signed this

:k!]_

day of JULY

1981.

BY THE COURT:

27
28

29
30

31

32
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1

2
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

3

4

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Findings and

5

Conclusions was mailed to the following attorneys this 23rd

6

day of July, 1981 by placing same ·in the United States mails,

7

addressed as follows:

8

9
10
11

12

Brent D. Young, Esquire
Ivie & Young
Attorneys for Plaintiff
48 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84601

s. Rex Lewis, Esquire
Howard, Lewis & Petersen
Attorneys for Defendants Bigelow
Provo, Utah 84603

13

141
15
16

17
18
19

20
21

22
23
24

25
26
27
28
29

30
31

32
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2
3
4
5

M. DAYLE JEFFS OF JEFFS AND JEFFS
Attorneys for Defendant Cluff
90 North 100 East
P. O. Box 683
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: 373-8848

6

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY

7

STATE OF UTAH

8

MACK HALLADAY and
MERLE HALLADAY,

9

Plaintiffs,

DECREE

10
vs.

11
12

MADGE CLUFF, PERRY K.
BIGELOW and NORMA G.
BIGELOW,

13

Defendants.

14
15
16
l7

18
19

20
21

22
23

24
25
26

Civil No.

53,243

·1

This matter came before the Court for trial on the
28th day of August, 1980, Brent D. Young, Esq., appearing for
the plaintiffs, M. Dayle Jeffs, Esq., appearing for defendant
Cluff, and S. Rex Lewis, Esq., appearing for defendants
Bigelow.

The parties presented their evidence and after

having presented final arguments to the Court on the facts
and the law the court took the matter under advisement.

On

December 3, 1930, plaintiff brought a motion to reopen for
the purpose.of offering additional evidence as to plaintiffs'
claim of title.

The court granted the motion to reopen and

received the additional evidence and having entered its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now makes and enters

27
the following:

28
29

30

D E C R E E
1.

Plaintiffs are granted a decree quieting

title to themselve$ to the following described property:

31
32
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1

2
Commencing 606.35 feet West and 319.36 feet North from the
Southeast corner of Section 2, Township 7 South, Range 2
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89°00' West
along the North boundary of 100 South Street, Provo, Utah
10.36 feet; thence North 1°00' East 174.10 feet; thence
South 89°00' East 7.49 feet; thence South 0°03'17" West
along a fence line 174.12 feet to the point of beginning.
Area = 0.04 acres

3
4

5

6

2.

7

8

Defendants Bigelow are granted a decree

quieting title to themselves in the area described as follows:
Commencing 488.57 feet West and 317.30 feet North from the
Southeast corner of Section 2, Township 7 South, Range 2
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89°00' West
along the North boundary of 100 South Street, Provo, Utah
7.29 feet; thence North 1°00' East 177.60 feet; thence
East 4.67 feet; thence South 0°09'25" West along a fence
line 177. 70 feet to the point of beginning. Area= 0. 02 Acres

9
10
11

12
13

3.

Defendants Cluff and Bigelow are granted

14

a decree quieting title in that portion of tract #4 on Exhibits

15

8 and 12 cross-hatched in orange, more particularly described

16

as follows:

17

Commencing 588.08 feet West and 495.00 feet North from the
Southeast corner of Section 2, Township 7 South, Range 2
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence West 118.10
feet; thence North 0°03'17" East along a fence line 55.31
feet; thence South 89°51'20" East along a fence line
118.20 feet; thence South 0°09'25" West along a fence
line 55.01 feet to the point of beginning. Area 0.15 Acres

18
19
20

21

Dated and signed this ..:l!1.- day of July, 1981.

22

BY THE COURT:

23
24

25
26

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

27

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Decree

28
29

30
31

was mailed to the following attorneys this 23rd day of July,
1981 by placing same in the United States mails, addressed
as follows:

32
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1

2
Brent D. Young, Esquire
Ivie & Young
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
48 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84601

3
4

5

s. Rex Lewis, Esquire
Howard, Lewis & Petersen
Attorneys for Defendants Bigelow
P. O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603

6

7

8
9
·Secretary

10
11
12
13

14

151
16

I

17

18
19
20
21

22
23
24

25
26

27
28

29
30
31
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